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SENIOR CORPORATE OFFICERS AND THE 
DUTY OF CANDOR:  DO THE CEO AND CFO 
HAVE A DUTY TO INFORM? 
Z. Jill Barclift* 
We found no evidence that members of the Board of Directors, other than Ebbers 
[Chairman and CEO] and Sullivan [CFO], were aware of the improper 
accounting practices at the time they occurred.  We have reviewed materials 
(including slide presentations) the Board received and have not found 
information that should reasonably have led it to detect the practices or to believe 
that further specific inquiry into the accounting practices at issue was 
necessary.1  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of corporate debacles resulting from accounting and 
other forms of fraud by corporate officers, oversight failures by public 
company boards have received widespread criticism.2  As a result, laws 
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor, Hamline University School of Law.  Before teaching at Hamline 
University School of Law, the author was executive vice president, secretary, and general 
counsel of a financial services company.  Her practice and scholarship areas include 
corporate law, governance, and business ethics.  The author extends sincere gratitute to her 
research assistants:  Teresa Fagerland, Nicole Grosvenor, Stephanie Angolkar, and Bryan 
Keberlein. 
1 DENNIS R. BERESFORD, NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH & C.B. ROGERS, JR., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
WORLDCOM, INC. 29 (Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with author), available at http://fl1.find 
law.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/bdspcomm60903rpt.pdf [hereinafter 
WORLDCOM SIC REPORT].  The Special Investigative Committee (“SIC”) consisted of 
directors not on the board at the time of the financial fraud.  Athough their investigation 
was thorough, the report is arguably somewhat self-serving, notwithstanding the special 
committee’s independence.  The First Interim Report of the Bankruptcy Court Examiner 
corroborates some of the SIC’s findings but also raises questions about the oversight duties 
of the board of WorldCom.  See FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH, BANKRUPTCY 
COURT EXAMINER 6-8 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw. 
com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/thornburgh1strpt.pdf. 
2 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 406 (2005); Stephen Labaton, Crime and 
Consequences Still Weigh on Corporate World; Four Years Later, Enron’s Shadow Lingers as 
Change Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at C1; Press Release, Business Roundtable, 
Business Roundtable CEOs Issues Updated “Best Practices” in Corporate Governance (Nov. 3, 
2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/taskForces/ 
taskforce/document.aspx?qs=6FA5BF159F949514481138A74EA1851159169FEB56A3BB1A8; 
The Conference Board Commission On Public Trust and Private Enterprise, Findings and 
Recommendations pt. 2 at 20 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/ 
documents/757.pdf; Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm., Remarks on 
Governance Reforms and Role of Directors before the National Association of Corporate Directors by 
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and regulations have been enacted to strengthen the role of public 
company boards.3   
However, in many recent high profile public company scandals, it 
was not the board’s failure to act on the information provided by senior 
officers, but the failure of senior officers to provide directors all relevant 
information that resulted in unsatisfactory corporate governance.  
Directors either were deliberately kept in the dark about certain details, 
provided only minimum levels of information, or senior officers 
remained silent, knowing directors believed false assumptions or 
inaccurate information.4    
Few Delaware cases directly address the duties and liabilities of 
senior corporate officers in their capacity as officers and not as directors 
or non-director officers.5  Instead, most cases and commentaries combine 
a discussion of director and officer obligations, generally concluding that 
their fiduciary duties are the same.6  However, this Article argues that 
accepting the fact that senior corporate officers and directors owe the 
same fiduciary duties fails to acknowledge the nature of the agency 
relationship that exists between officers and directors, and between 
officers and shareholders.  Simply defining officers’ fiduciary duties the 
same as directors does little to hold senior corporate officers accountable 
for failing to provide information to directors.  Senior corporate officers 
of public companies, CEOs and CFOs, owe directors and the corporation 
a duty to inform in a way that is not owed by directors to shareholders.7  
                                                                                                             
Commissioner, 2-3 (Oct. 20, 2003) (on file with author), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/spch102003cag.htm. 
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002); New York Stock Exchange, Corporate 
Governance Rules (2003) (on file with author), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
finalcorpgovrules.pdf.  The NYSE Rules require listed companies to have a majority of 
independent directors. 
4 WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., RAYMOND S. TROUBB & HERBERT S. WINOKER, JR., REPORT OF 
THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE OF ENRON, 148–49 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http:// 
fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf [hereinafter 
ENRON SIC REPORT]; WORLDCOM SIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-33.  See generally NANCY B. 
RAPOPORT & BALA G. DHARAN, ENRON:  CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
(2004) (providing an overall analysis of the corporate collapse of Enron). 
5 The Chief Executive Officer in modern public corporations is typically the Chairman 
of the Board.  It varies in public companies whether the Chief Financial Officer is a director. 
6 See Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2004). 
7 The Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) are the focus 
of this Article because they are the two most senior officers within a public company.  In 
addition, Delaware’s personal jurisdiction statute covers senior officers and is defined to 
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Corporate crises and eventual bankruptcies of several public 
companies illustrate the catastrophic consequences that occur when 
senior corporate officers use their position of power, control, and 
influence to keep directors in the dark about corporate misdoings.8 
Absent an underlying affirmative duty to disclose to directors, senior 
corporate officers will provide only minimal information to directors.9  
And, disclosure of minimal information is not enough for directors to 
adequately interpret and digest complex corporate-wide transactions 
made by cross-corporate subsidiaries, to assess “red flags,” or to evaluate 
the integrity of information, thereby enabling directors to meet their 
fiduciary and statutory obligations to shareholders.10  
This Article focuses on the duty to inform as a framework to assess 
liability of senior officers of public companies who withhold information 
from directors.11  The broadening of the definition of the duty to inform 
that senior officers owe directors to include an underlying affirmative 
duty to provide information, even when director or shareholder action is 
not requested, offers an opportunity for greater monitoring of corporate 
governance by focusing on those often most culpable.12  Currently, the 
plain language of Delaware’s delegation of authority statute protects 
directors who reasonably rely in good faith on the reports of corporate 
officers.13  However, officers’ reports must include more than minimum 
                                                                                                             
include the CEO and CFO.  Sarbanes-Oxley officer certifications are required of the CEO 
and CFO as the senior most responsible officer within a public company. 
8 See generally DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM:  THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN 
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM, 170-72 (2005) (discussing corporate 
culture and the CEO). 
9 RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE:  WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD 
PEOPLE DO BAD THINGS 67-81 (1996) (providing an overview of the issues surrounding 
corporate managers’ control of corporate powers); Jay W. Lorsch & Elizabeth MacIver, 
Pawns or Potentates:  The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 108 (Thomas Clarke ed., Routledge 2004) (discussing the limited role of 
directors in managing the corporation).  See also Myles L. Mace, Directors:  Myth and 
Reality, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 96, 98-99 (Thomas Clarke ed., Routledge 
2004).  See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY:  AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE 
AT A CROSSROADS 1-24 (2006) (providing an overview of cultures of dishonesty). 
10 ENRON SIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 157 (describing the complexity of subsidiary 
transaction making it difficult for the board to see the entire corporate risks).  See BALA G. 
DHARAN & WILLIAM R. BUFKINS, ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 
111, 113, 115 (2004). 
11 A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director 
Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW 215, 226-29 (1992).  The focus is on the CEO and CFO as the 
senior most responsible corporate officers. CEOs are directly hired by boards. 
12 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at 
*41 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005). 
13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2005). 
Barclift: Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of Candor:  Do the CEO and
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
272 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
disclosure requirements.14  An affirmative duty to inform means senior 
corporate officers may not remain silent when in possession of superior 
information unknown to directors and that they have an underlying 
obligation of disclosure to enable directors to properly meet their 
oversight obligations.15  Part II of this Article provides an overview of the 
Disney litigation.  Specifically, this part examines an aspect of the Disney 
opinion where the court discusses whether senior officers and directors 
are comparable fiduciaries. 
Part III of this Article explores the rationale that senior corporate 
officers and directors owe the same fiduciary duties.16  More specifically, 
this Part examines the duty to inform and its functional ability to impose 
agency cost controls to manage the position of power senior officers have 
over boards. The duty to inform serves as a separator of management 
duties and is an identifiable way to explain how senior officers’ roles as 
agents differ from directors and what that difference ought to mean for 
accountability to directors, the corporation, and, ultimately, the 
shareholders.    
Part IV examines the duty of disclosure in Delaware.  In particular, 
this Part examines the disclosure duties directors owe shareholders and 
the shift of the duty of candor to a duty of disclosure.  Comparing the 
disclosure duties directors owe shareholders to the disclosure duties 
senior officers owe directors exposes gaps in fiduciary responsibility. 
This gap is a result of underdeveloped case law defining the fiduciary 
duties owed by corporate officers to directors. However, Part IV suggests 
that Delaware case law does speak to the different roles of senior officers 
and directors and may offer some support for finding an underlying 
duty to inform owed to directors.  
Part V explores the fiduciary duties of senior officers as managers of 
the day-to-day affairs of the corporation and their superior position of 
control over directors.  This Part calls for finding an underlying 
affirmative and separate duty to disclose for senior officers.  Part V also 
                                                 
14 See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (holding that directors who provide 
false information to shareholders violate fiduciary duties even in the absence of a request 
for action by shareholders). 
15 See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 227-28 (discussing the meaning of the non-
director officers’ duties to inform). 
16 This Article is part of a broader research project to assess the ability of corporate 
governance theories to define the responsibilities and liabilities of senior corporate officers 
to the corporation and directors. 
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briefly examines agency theories of sub-agent and co-agent in three-way 
agency relationships.   
Finally, in Part VI, this Article concludes that Delaware state 
fiduciary claims remain an important tool for shareholders to monitor 
corporate governance. Finding an underlying affirmative duty to 
disclose, judged from a standard of materiality, provides strict liability 
enforcement of such breaches.  In a derivative suit, enjoining a board’s 
decision as voidable when senior officers fail to provide information 
causes a board not to satisfy its fiduciary or statutory obligations.  In a 
direct claim, raising the standard of review allows enhanced scrutiny for 
materiality, rather than the business judgment rule for senior corporate 
officer liability.    
Recently, Delaware’s personal jurisdiction statute has been amended 
to extend personal jurisdiction over corporate senior officers and 
executives.17  With this amendment, we are likely to see a more robust 
interpretation of Delaware fiduciary law as it applies to senior corporate 
officers.18  Further, Delaware’s exculpation statute, limiting the monetary 
liability for breach of certain fiduciary duties of directors, does not limit 
the monetary liability of officers.19  Consequently, there is a potential for 
monetary recovery against senior officers who fail to provide directors 
information needed to meet their statutory and fiduciary obligations.20  
                                                 
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b).  The statute defines officer to mean the CEO, CFO, 
and the top five mostly highly compensated executives under SEC filings among others as 
being subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware.  Id. 
18 See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGuglielmo, What Happened in Delaware 
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?:  A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1504 (2005).  The authors reflect on the role of Delaware courts and 
private action enforcement.  Id. 
19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  The statute does not include limitation of liability 
protections to officers.  Id.  Of course, the legislature is free to amend the statute to limit the 
liability of officers.  Id.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(c) (1984). Several states 
include officers in their limitations of liability provisions.  Id.  See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. 
Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1288 (Del. 1994); Goodwin v. Live Entertainment, No. Civ.A. 
15765, 1999 WL 64265 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999).  
20 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the 
Business Judgment Rule:  A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870 (2005); Lyman 
P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 462 (2005) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Officers]; Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 229.  
Recovery would not be for securities fraud but for underlying state breach of fiduciary 
duty.  See also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13-14 (Del. 1998). 
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II.  THE DISNEY LITIGATION:  A QUESTION FROM THE COURT 
Recently, the Delaware Chancery Court, in In re The Walt Disney 
Company Derivative Litigation,21 concluded that Michael Eisner, CEO and 
Chairman of Walt Disney Company (“Disney”), did not act in a grossly 
negligent manner when hiring and subsequently terminating its 
president.22  However, the court sharply criticized Eisner’s actions as a 
corporate executive as less than stellar.23  Eisner had negotiated with and 
hired Michael Ovitz, a personal friend, as president of Disney.24  Ovitz 
was later terminated and paid a substantial sum of money under the 
terms of a negotiated employment contract.25   
The court determined that in his capacity as CEO, Eisner had failed 
to keep the board informed, stretched the outer boundaries of his 
authority, and had taken actions to pressure the board to approve his 
decisions.26  Notwithstanding, the court concluded that Eisner still had 
not breached any fiduciary duty and had acted in good faith in meeting 
his obligations as director to the Disney shareholders.27  Yet the court still 
called Eisner the most culpable of defendants because he was the one 
“pulling the strings” and was the most informed on the details of the 
employment contract.28  The court then noted that, because the parties 
treated both officers and directors as comparable fiduciaries, it was not 
necessary to address corporate officers’ liability.29   
Why is it that Eisner, in his capacity as CEO, can be the one “pulling 
the strings” as a senior officer of Disney, and yet, as a director, still have 
met his fiduciary duties?30  As with the majority of public company 
boards, CEOs control almost all aspects of information provided to the 
board.31  Yet when the CEO dominates the board process by failing to 
                                                 
21 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).  Eisner, CEO and Chairman of the board, was sued in his capacity as 
Chairman of the board. 
22 Id. at *41. 
23 Id. at *40; Dennis O. Garris, Opinion and Order:  In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 1515 PLI/CORP 49, 190-91 (2005). 
24 In re The Walt Disney Co., 2005 WL 2056651, at *20-22. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at *41.  See also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (explaining that 
failure to meet aspirational goals alone does not necessarily violate Delaware law). 
27 In re The Walt Disney Co., 2005 WL 2056651, at *50. 
28 Id. at *40.  The court describes Eisner as “Machiavellian” and blamed Eisner for the 
failure in corporate governance at Disney.  Id. 
29 Id. at *50 & n.588. 
30 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256. 
31 See Lorsche & McIver, supra note 9, at 110-12. 
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provide adequate reports to directors, it is the board that is potentially 
responsible to shareholders for the oversight failure.32  The Delaware 
Chancery Court reflected on this dichotomy in board governance and 
asked whether officers and directors are comparable fiduciaries.33  If 
Eisner had been sued in his capacity as CEO, would he be liable for 
failing to fully inform the board?  The Disney Litigation illustrates the 
difficulty of ferreting out senior officers’ liability in non-loyalty 
situations.  The aim of this Article is to suggest a theory of liability for 
senior corporate officers of public companies in the specific context of 
the duty to inform.34  
III.  AGENCY PRINCIPLES AND CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 
The position of the president is different.  Practically he [is] the master of the 
situation.35 
A. Agency Theory  
The corporate governance debate over the duties of management 
and the role of shareholders has often centered on who really owns the 
corporation.36  Although the principal-agent model is the predominant 
theory for defining the duties of directors to shareholders, it is limited in 
defining senior officers’ duties to directors.37 A focus on agency 
principles as a foundation for understanding senior officers’ duties to 
directors seems obvious and logical, but a deeper examination reveals 
that the different roles and nature of the agency relationship between 
officers and directors lacks clarity or is simply not defined.38  The 
dominating force of senior executives on corporate governance has led to 
a call for more discourse on understanding, defining, and assessing 
officers’ corporate duties to directors and shareholders and the officers’ 
                                                 
32 See Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, 5-12 (2005) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/CorporateGovPrinciples. 
pdf. 
33 In re The Walt Disney Co., 2005 WL 2056651, at *50 & n.588 
34 The focus of this Article is limited to senior corporate officer of public companies; the 
analysis for private closely held companies may be more compelling. 
35 Bates v. Bates, 251 U.S. 524, 530 (1920). 
36 See generally JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  AN 
OVERVIEW 2-3 (1991); PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt 
& Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:  THE 
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 4-7 (1994) (providing a historical 
perspective of shareholders as corporate owners). 
37 See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). 
38 Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1601-02. 
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roles in corporate governance.39  The conversation begins with a simple 
and straightforward reminder that officers are agents of the 
corporation.40  However, an analysis of agency case law reveals that 
agency theory is primarily focused on the authority of senior officers to 
act on behalf of the corporation, and there is less analysis on the 
fiduciary duties of officers to directors.41  
Delaware’s delegation of authority statute is typical of most, as it 
authorizes the board to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation and to delegate certain day-to-day management of corporate 
business to officers.42  It provides that directors’ roles are that of 
oversight to senior officers,43 and that directors cannot delegate their 
absolute responsibilities to officers of the corporation.44  What makes this 
corporate governance observation so palpable is that its simplicity 
escapes a more detailed analysis of the agency relationship that turns the 
question of “who runs the corporation” on its head.45  In reality, senior 
corporate executives manage and control a great deal in the hiring of 
board members and in deciding what information gets communicated to 
the board.46  However, current law does not appropriately address the 
effect of such a role reversal on agency principles in defining fiduciary 
duties.47 
                                                 
39 Id. at 1605, 1623 (discussing the blurring of corporate law officer fiduciary duties with 
agency costs theory); Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation:  Problems of 
Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2003) [hereinafter Langevoort, Agency 
Law Inside the Corporation]. 
40 Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1617 (discussing the control of CEOs over corporate 
boards and its impact of agency theory and corporate governance); Langevoort, Agency Law 
Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1187, 1193. 
41 See DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2005) (providing references to cases exploring 
apparent authority and implied powers of corporate officers). 
42 Id. § 141(a); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev’d on other 
grounds, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).  The rationale for concluding that officers and directors 
owe the same fiduciary duties to shareholders is that, as management, both know more 
about the day-to-day business affairs of the corporation than shareholders and both are 
agents of the corporations.  Id.  See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984); Grimes v. 
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Del. 1996) (quoting Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 899 
(Del. Ch. 1956)). 
43 See generally Veasey & DiGuglielmo, supra note 18, at 1436-40 (providing an overview 
of the boards’ oversight roles). 
44 See generally Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 805 (Del. 1966); Adams v. Clearance 
Corp., 121 A.2d 302, 304 (Del. 1956). 
45 See Lorsche & McIver, supra note 9, at 110-13. 
46 See Commission on Public Trust, supra note 2. 
47 See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:  A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 20-31 (2005) (discussing of agency costs and the legal 
constraints on the agent). 
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Fiduciary principles of agency theory are the predominant theory of 
corporate governance for defining the relationship between centralized 
management and shareholders.48  Broadly defined, the fiduciary duties 
of the agent to the principal are the duties of loyalty, obedience, care, and 
to provide information.49  The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines this 
last duty to give information, or the duty of candor, as an affirmative 
duty to use reasonable efforts to provide the principal relevant 
information.50  This duty not only arises when the agent must 
communicate with the principal,51 but also binds the agent to provide 
material information to the principal relevant to the scope of the 
relationship.52 As a result, the Restatement balances the self-interest of the 
agent and the information needs of the principal by holding the agent to 
a negligence standard of liability.53  Absent a conflict of interest, the duty 
to inform remains an underlying duty judged in the context of what the 
principal deems relevant.54  
Cases relying on agency theories to hold officers liable primarily 
relate to the authority of officers vis-à-vis third parties.55  Most cases and 
commentaries conclude that officers are agents of the corporation with 
                                                 
48 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 104 J. POL. ECON. 3, 6 (1996), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID-04043 (discussing agency costs 
theory).  The authors examine agency costs theory and explain why the agent will always 
act with self-interest and why the principal incurs costs to monitor the activities of the 
agent.  Id.  A more detailed overview of the history of agency theory is beyond the scope of 
this paper.    See also KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 32-70 (discussing agency theory 
and shareholder protections in the United States and a comparative analysis); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Rischel, John M. Olin Centennial Conference in Law and Economics, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L & ECON. 1, 425-27 (1993). 
49 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 379-87 (1958) (duty of agent to principal as 
the duty of care and skill, duty of good conduct and the duty to give information, duty to 
keep and render accounts, duty to act as authorized, duty not to act impracticably, duty to 
obey, and duty of loyalty).  See also Sci. Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 
A.2d 957, 962 (Del. 1980) (defining basic duties of agent to principal). 
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381.  See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, 
Calling Off the Lynch Mob:  The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 1087, 1105 (1996) [hereinafter Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob] (discussing 
history of director duty to disclose to shareholders). 
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. § 381 & cmt. 
54 Id. 
55 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2005) (containing cross references of cases 
on authority of officers).  The rationale for concluding that officers and directors owe the 
same fiduciary duties to shareholders is that, as management, both know more about the 
day-to-day business affairs of the corporation than shareholders and both are agents of the 
corporations.  Id. 
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little definition as to the nature of the agency relationship.56  Over time, 
corporate governance began to view the rules of governance, fiduciary 
principles, and standards of liability for directors and officers as the 
same—management as a single agent of shareholders.57  Courts are 
mostly comfortable with the conclusion that officers and directors are 
management of the corporation and owe the same fiduciary duties of 
care, loyalty, and good faith.58  However, treating senior officers and 
directors the same also means that standards of liability and review, and 
the business judgment rule apply equally to officers’ and directors’ 
decisions.59  Yet officers’ agency relationships to directors and 
shareholders are rarely directly addressed.60   
Fiduciary principles applicable to directors have developed with two 
basic understandings—the need for directors to exercise reasonable 
business judgment and the limitations inherent in the directors’ abilities 
to really know the details of corporate business.61  In particular, when 
senior executives foster corporate cultures of deception and lack of 
candor, directors are unable to reasonably rely on the information 
provided and may fail to meet their fiduciary and statutory obligations.62  
However, a return to agency theories and a focus on the duty to inform 
properly refocuses the analytic framework for assessing corporate officer 
misconduct on those who are often the most culpable or minimally have 
the most information about corporate affairs and exercise the most 
control.63 Additionally, agency principles do not require the 
advancement of new theories of liability and they bring a source of 
                                                 
56 See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESS A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ch. 4 (Aspen 1997) (discussing officer and 
director duties).  See also Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1602-03 (discussing the need for 
clarity of the nature of the agency relationship between directors and officers). 
57 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1610-17. 
58 See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 56.  See also Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 
20, at 866-67; Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 20, at 442.  The authors argue that the 
Business Judgment Rule and policy rationales for treating officers and directors the same 
are valid.  Id. 
59 See generally BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 56.  See also Johnson, Corporate Officers, 
supra note 20, at 442. 
60 See Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 20, at 444-47; Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, 
at 1613-14. 
61 See Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 632 (2000) 
[hereinafter Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule]; Veasey & DiGuglielmo, supra note 
18, at 1421.  See generally BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 56. 
62 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(e) (2005); Mills Acquisition Co. v Macmillan, Inc., 559 
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
63 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1623 (discussing the blurring of corporate law 
officer fiduciary duties with agency costs theory); Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the 
Corporation, supra note 39, at 1200. 
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defined principles to the duties owed by senior corporate officers to 
directors and, ultimately, the shareholders.64   
B. Officers’ Fiduciary Duties 
What duties do officers—directors in their capacity as officers and 
non-director officers—owe to the Board?  Few Delaware cases directly 
address the fiduciary obligations of corporate officers who are directors 
or non-director officers.65  There are many likely reasons for this.  First, 
CEOs are also directors and are sued rarely in their capacity as an 
officer.66  Second, a claim for breach of fiduciary duties against corporate 
officers is likely derivative.67  Finally, the majority of claims against 
public companies’ officers for breach of disclosure duties are for 
violations of federal securities laws. 68   
Although there are few Delaware cases, the American Bar 
Association and the American Law Institute offer some guidance on 
senior officers’ duties to directors.  The Model Business Corporation Act 
(“MBCA”) defines standards of conduct and liability for officers as 
nearly identical to those for directors.69  Additionally, commentary to the 
MBCA suggests that in certain circumstances, officers may be judged 
under different standards due to the officers’ greater access to 
information.70  Similarly, American Law Institute (“ALI”) principles 
define the duties of senior officers as nearly identical to those of 
                                                 
64 Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1617 (discussing the control of CEOs over corporate 
boards and its impact of agency theory and corporate governance); Langevoort, Agency Law 
Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1193 (discussing recalling why officers are agents 
will better able attorneys to advise corporate officers on their fiduciary obligations). 
65 See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of 
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1590-1609 (2005) (discussing the intertwined 
relationship between state law and federal law on disclosure duties); Carl W. Mills, Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty as Securities Fraud:  SEC v. Chancellor Corp., 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 439, 448-54 (2005). 
66 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1612-13 (suggesting a lack of personal 
jurisdiction over officers as the reason for few lawsuits). 
67 See Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1206-07 (discussing 
derivative suit and breach of the duty of candor). 
68 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1612-13 (discussing other reasons officers are 
not directly sued by shareholders; employment contract and terminations are not public); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 65, at 1578-84 (discussing relation of state and federal law); 
Langevoort, Agency Law in the Corporation, supra note 39, at 286; Mills, supra note 65, at 447 
(discussing federal vs. state law in disclosures breaches); Michael A. Perion, Fraud and 
Federalism:  Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 
279-90 (1998) (discussing state and federal securities laws). 
69 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42 & cmt. (1984). 
70 Id. 
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directors.71  Specifically, ALI principles provide that directors and 
officers owe a duty of fair dealing premised on disclosure.72   
However, an important Delaware decision serves as a starting point 
to understand the duty of officers.  Remembering the Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, (Trans Union Corp.), case is useful to begin a retro-perspective 
on how the Delaware court views officers’ failure to inform.73   Van 
Gorkom remains an important case to understand the impact of an 
officer’s failure to properly inform the Board and reminds us that 
Delaware’s Supreme Court recognizes the role of senior officers in 
corporate culpability when they fail to keep directors informed.74  
Twenty years later, although criticized heavily at the time, Van Gorkom 
demonstrates the prescience of Delaware’s Supreme Court in the post-
Enron environment for corporate governance.75   
C. A Lesson from Van Gorkom:  The Failure To Inform  
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that 
the directors of Trans Union breached their fiduciary duty of care to 
shareholders by failing to reasonably inform themselves of all relevant 
and reasonably available information.76 Additionally, the court 
determined that the directors had also breached their duty by failing to 
inform themselves of Van Gorkom’s role in the sale and purchase price 
for the company.77  Consequently, Van Gorkom, who served as both 
Chairman and CEO of Trans Union, was found liable along with the 
                                                 
71 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02–
5.09 (1994). 
72 Id. § 5.02.  The plain reading of § 141(b) of the Delaware Code is that officers are 
agents of directors of which the board is entitled to rely.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) 
(2005).  See also Langervoote, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1200; 
Lorsch & McIvers, supra note 9, at 1629 (discussing the fiduciary duties of officers as loyalty 
and care); Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 216. 
73 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863 (Del. 1985).  The class action also involved 
the defendant Trans Union Corporation (“Trans Union”).  Id. 
74 See Symposium, Van Gorkom and The Corporate Board:  Problem, Solution, or Placebo, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 2 (2005) (providing a compilation of articles addressing the impact of the 
Trans Union case on Delaware corporate law). 
75 See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 477, 485 (2000) (discussing the analytical flaws of the case); Van Gorkom and the 
Corporate Board, supra note 74 (providing compilation of articles addressing the impact of 
the Trans Union case on Delaware corporate law). 
76 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864. 
77 Id. 
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other directors for breaching their duty of care and failing to disclose 
material information to shareholders.78  
Much like the court in Disney, the Van Gorkom court’s sharper 
language concerns the behavior of Van Gorkom.  The court described 
Van Gorkom’s “report” to the board concerning the sale of the company 
as uninformed and emphasized that the board had made its decisions 
based upon an unwarranted reliance of the CEO’s report.79  Additionally, 
the court noted that Van Gorkom suggested the premium price but did 
not disclose to the board his methodology for selecting the premium.80  
In fact, the court inferred that the board may have been the victim of a 
“fast shuffle” by Van Gorkom.81 
In the motion for reargument, the court noted that in the early 
supplemental briefing of the case, the court had questioned the attorney 
representing all nine individual defendants on whether Van Gorkom 
should be distinguished from the other director defendants.82  Van 
Gorkom provided no documentation or support to the board concerning 
the basis for his recommendation to approve the transaction and the 
board was reliant on a twenty minute presentation by Van Gorkom.83  
Accordingly, the court suggested that Van Gorkom, in his role as CEO, 
failed to inform the board of all information known to him at the time.  
In particular, Van Gorkom’s failure caused the directors to breach their 
disclosure obligations to shareholders.84  
                                                 
78 Id. at 864-66. 
79 Id. at 874. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 877; id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. at 898-99 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 868 (majority opinion).  What is not addressed by the court is Van Gorkom’s 
duty to the board.  Did Van Gorkom have a duty to speak and provide all relevant 
information to the board?  There is nothing to indicate the board was on notice that reliance 
on Van Gorkom was unwarranted.  Absent evidence the board unreasonably relied on Van 
Gorkom, what was the basis for concluding the board should not have relied on Van 
Gorkom?  The Trans Union case has been critiqued for its weak rationale.  Specifically, the 
court’s rationale is weak because it failed to analyze an important corollary to the director’s 
duty to be informed—that is the officers’ (agents’) duty to inform the directors (principal) 
of all relevant information needed to make a decision.  Did Van Gorkom breach a duty of 
candor owed by an agent to a principal?  Does the duty of candor include the duty to speak 
up?  Are the duty of candor and the duty of disclosure the same?  Is the duty of candor 
owed by officers to directors different from the duty owed by directors to shareholders?  
Do corporate officers owe greater fiduciary duties than directors? 
84 Id. at 890.  In the context of materiality one can argue over whether what he failed to 
inform was material. 
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D. Providing Information:  The Role of Officers   
In Smith v. Van Gorkom and in In re The Walt Disney Company 
Derivative Litigation, Delaware courts suggested, without directly finding, 
a greater culpability of the director who is also an officer, than for other 
directors.85  The Delaware Chancery Court raised the question of 
whether theories of liability against corporate directors should differ 
from theories of liability against corporate officers.86  In this post-scandal 
world of corporate governance, the role of officers as a pivotal conduit of 
vital corporate information is highlighted when hindsight review of 
catastrophic failures reveals that directors were not fully aware of 
corporate business facts that were necessary to make informed decisions 
and to engage in proper oversight.87  Finding an underlying duty to 
inform requires senior officers to have candid, open conversations with 
directors,88 and reinforces the function of the board as oversight to 
management.89  It also offers the opportunity to balance the relationship 
of control exercised by senior officers over boards.90  
The analysis begins with an examination of the duty of disclosure 
owed by the board to shareholders.  It indicates that imposing directors’ 
duties on officers does not always hold the most culpable corporate 
actors responsible.  The need to differentiate the duties of officers and 
directors is illustrated by understanding the history and rationale for the 
duty of candor, and the movement away from the duty of candor to a 
disclosure duty.91  The benefits and limits to corporate governance are 
also demonstrated.92 
                                                 
85 Id. at 899.  In denying the motion for reargument, the court questions whether Van 
Gorkom is distinguishable from the other directors in assessing liability.  Id.  The issue 
before the court was to decide the liability of the directors; as is often the case, the court 
was not asked to decide the liability of a corporate officer as officer and in particular the 
liability of Van Gorkom as chief executive officer for breach of the duty of care.  Id. 
86 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 1875804, at 
*50 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005). 
87 Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat:  Lessons from the Recent 
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 
GEO. L.J. 285, 291 (2004) [hereinafter Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat] 
(discussing the imbalance of corporate power). 
88 Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1206. 
89 Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat, supra note 87, at 304 (discussing the 
imbalance of corporate power). 
90 Id. 
91 Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1200 (discussing the 
specific duties of the CEO owed to the corporation). 
92 Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1114-16 (describing Lynch as 
the “genesis of” Delaware Law on disclosure). 
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IV.   THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE IN DELAWARE:  FROM CANDOR TO DISCLOSURE 
A. Directors’ Duties To Disclose to Shareholders 
Directors’ duties to disclose to shareholders have developed over a 
series of cases involving a board’s communication to shareholders 
seeking action in mergers, majority and minority shareholder 
transactions, and tender offers.93  In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., an 
early case on the duty of candor, the court defined the duty of candor as 
the duty an agent owes a principal when in possession of special 
knowledge.94  The court concluded that when the board sought 
shareholder approval in the context of a tender offer by majority 
shareholders to minority shareholders, the board owed shareholders a 
duty of “complete candor.”95  Lynch established that directors owe a duty 
of candor to shareholders and that the basis of this duty is the superior 
position of directors.96  As a result, the fiduciary duty of candor requires 
disclosure of all “germane facts” to communications requiring 
shareholder action.97   
Several issues remain unanswered after Lynch.98  The first is the 
meaning of “germane facts.”  Second, do directors have an underlying 
affirmative duty of candor absent communication to shareholders?  
Third, is the duty of candor a separate duty or an underlying obligation 
of the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith?99   
1. “Germane Facts” and Materiality 
In subsequent Delaware decisions, “germane facts” were interpreted 
to mean material facts.100  Materiality thus became the primary focus of 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1978). 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  The basis of this duty is also reflected in the fundamental rights of shareholders to 
a voice in corporate transactions directly affecting stockholder ownership.  Arnold v. Soc’y 
for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994). 
97 Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281. 
98 Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1115-18 (discussing the 
meaning of Lynch). 
99 Id. (discussing key cases on director’s fiduciary duty of disclosure). 
100 Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 847-48 (Del. 1987) (assessing director 
liability for failing to disclose to shareholders turns on issues of materiality and drawing on 
federal case law definition of material); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944-45 
(Del. 1985). 
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disclosure cases in shareholder litigation.101  Once the court established 
that the board had an affirmative obligation to communicate to 
shareholders, or that it voluntarily chose to communicate to 
shareholders, complete material disclosure is required.102  Directors who 
fail to disclose material information are per se liable for the false 
communication.103    
2. Affirmative Duty  
Later, the Delaware Supreme Court established that directors do not 
owe shareholders an underlying duty of disclosure absent mandatory or 
voluntary communications to shareholders.104   Moving away from 
Lynch, which suggested that the duty to inform means “complete” 
candor at all times and105 preferring to describe the duty of candor as a 
disclosure duty, the court concluded that directors do not have a duty of 
disclosure until required or when they voluntarily communicate.106  
After directors communicate to shareholders, then the duty of disclosure 
mandates disclosure of all relevant material information to 
shareholders.107  However, the duty to disclose does not include an 
obligation that directors engage in “self-flagellation.”108  Boards are not 
                                                 
101 See Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1279; Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 777-78 (Del. 1993); Shell 
Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 115 (Del. 1992); Bershad, 535 A.2d at 847-48; 
Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944-45; Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1124-
41 (discussing key cases on director’s fiduciary duty of disclosure). 
102 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998); Brody v. Zaucha, 697 A.2d 749, 755 (Del. 
1997); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993); Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944. 
103 Malone, 722 A.2d at 9; Tri-Star Pictures, 634 A.2d at 333.  Both courts indicate that a 
fiduciary duty of disclosure breach is a per se violation not requiring reliance by 
shareholders.  See also Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1124-41 
(discussing key cases on director’s fiduciary duty of disclosure).  See also Faith Stevelman 
Kahn, Transparency and Accountability:  Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to 
Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 520 (providing an analysis of the implications of 
Malone on Delaware’s fiduciary law). 
104 Malone, 722 A.2d at 9 (holding that “directors who knowingly disseminate false 
information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individual stockholder violate 
their fiduciary duty, and may be held accountable in a manner appropriate to the 
circumstances”); Brody, 697 A.2d at 754; Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84-85 (Del. 1992); 
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66-67 (Del. 1989). 
105 Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1124-41 (discussing key cases 
on director’s fiduciary duty of disclosure). 
106 Brody, 697 A.2d at 754; Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84-85; Shell, 606 A.2d at 115; Citron, 569 
A.2d at 66-67.  The rationale is not to overload shareholders with information.  See Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). 
107 Malone, 722 A.2d at 9. 
108 Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84; Shell, 606 A.2d at 115.  Directors are under no affirmative duty 
to speak up unless communicating with shareholders either as required or voluntarily.  
“Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material 
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required to present all information available to directors to 
shareholders.109  Specifically, if a transaction does not require 
shareholder approval, directors are under no underlying obligation to 
inform.110  The rationale for not finding an affirmative duty is based on 
the need to allow directors to manage the corporation and not 
overwhelm shareholders with information.111  
3. Separate Duty 
It matters whether the duty of disclosure is a separate duty under 
Delaware law for two reasons.  First, under Delaware’s exculpation 
statute, only breaches of good faith and loyalty are exceptions to the 
limitations of liability.112  Second, if the duty of disclosure is part of the 
duty of care or an independent duty, then it is subject to the limitation of 
liability provisions.113  
In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., the Delaware Supreme 
Court concluded the duty of disclosure is a separate duty subject to 
Delaware’s exculpation statute.114  The court then determined that 
disclosure violations can be subject to limitation of liability provisions 
unless the disclosure violations are alleged to have breached a duty of 
good faith or loyalty.115  Moreover, the Arnold court directly addressed 
the issue of whether the duty of disclosure was a separate duty under the 
limitation of liability provisions and concluded that it was subject to the 
statute because it was not expressly included by the legislature as an 
exception.116  However, the court did not directly address whether the 
duty of disclosure was part of good faith or part of the duty of loyalty.117  
                                                                                                             
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.”  Stroud, 606 A.2d 
at 84-88.  Yet, Stroud limits itself to private companies and Cinerama, citing the same rule in 
context of merger.  Id. at 84.  The duty to loyalty also raises obligations to disclosure 
conflicts of interest.  See generally Brody, 697 A.2d 749. 
109 Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84. 
110 Malone, 722 A.2d at 9.  When directors communicate to shareholders even when no 
action is requested directors owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure and must provide accurate 
information.  Id. 
111 Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1124-41 (discussing key cases 
on director’s fiduciary duty of disclosure). 
112 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005). 
113 Id.; Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. 
Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1286-87 (Del. 1994). 
114 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1286-87. 
115 Id. (stating duty of disclosure is a separate duty from good faith and loyalty and 
therefore included in definition of fiduciary duties in DEL. CODE. ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) and 
can be limited by liability as with duty of care). 
116 Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1287. 
117 Id. at 1288. 
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A narrow reading of Arnold is that for purposes of determining whether 
Delaware’s limitation of liability provisions apply to a disclosure breach, 
it is subject to exculpation, unless the lack of disclosure is plead as a 
good faith or loyalty breach.118  A broader reading of Arnold is that the 
duty of disclosure is a separate, independent duty.119  
In Malpiede, the court somewhat narrowed Arnold and concluded 
that the duty of disclosure is not separate, but is part of the duties of care 
and loyalty.120  In particular, the court in Malpiede v. Townson concluded 
the fiduciary duty of disclosure is not an “independent dut[y] but 
[applies] in a specific context of the board’s fiduciary duties of care, good 
faith, and loyalty.”121  The court then reconciled Arnold by concluding 
that when there is an affirmative duty to communicate to shareholders, 
specifically in a merger, directors’ disclosure duty breaches must be 
alleged in the context of one of the duties of care, good faith, or loyalty.122 
As a result of these cases, it remains unclear whether a duty of 
disclosure is an independent duty outside of the transactional 
communication to shareholders.123  Absent an underlying duty of 
disclosure, it is difficult to rationalize any independent duty of 
directors.124 Directors’ duties to inform are narrower than the Restatement 
suggests is appropriate for an agent to disclose to a principal. Limitations 
on directors’ duties to inform when communicating to shareholders 
became necessary because of the role of directors in managing the affairs 
of the corporation.  Thus, cases evolved to define directors, duties to 
inform to reconcile the limitation on directors’ informational knowledge, 
and the need of shareholders to have information when called to vote or 
to act.  
                                                 
118 Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1124-41 (discussing key cases 
on director’s fiduciary duty of disclosure). 
119 Id. 
120 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995) (citing Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993)).  
The duty of disclosure is an obligation that has been characterized as a derivative of the 
duties of care and loyalty.  Additionally, the focus of candor is disclosure and materiality in 
communication to shareholders and tender offer communications by directors to 
shareholders related to materiality of all information disclosed to board. 
121 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1086; Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998). 
122 Malpeide, 780 A.2d at 1086.  Arnold and Malpeide are difficult to reconcile.  Id. 
123 Id. at 1086; Malone, 722 A.2d at 9. 
124 See Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1149 (arguing it is an 
affirmative duty). But see Malpeide, 722 A.2d at 9. 
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B. Officers’ Duties To Disclose to Directors 
Delaware courts have not directly defined an officer’s duty to 
disclose (in non-loyalty breach cases) where a shareholder vote is not 
required.125  However, Delaware courts have concluded that, in 
communications to shareholders, officers also owe a duty to inform and 
must not provide false or misleading information.126 Applying the 
materiality, affirmative duty, and separate duty analyses to senior 
officers reveals the need for clarity in defining the duty to inform owed 
by CEOs and CFOs to the board.  
1. Materiality 
The Restatement of Agency defines the duty of the agent to inform the 
principal of material or relevant facts that the agent knows and which 
the principal wants to know.127  Officers are subject to the same 
standards of materiality as directors in cases where directors’ 
communications to shareholders are reliant upon material disclosure 
from officers. 128  
In Malpiede, the Delaware Supreme Court defined materiality to be 
consistent with the federal definition—likelihood of a reasonable 
investor viewing the information as material.129  Accordingly, issues of 
materiality of disclosures require enhanced scrutiny by the courts to 
assess disclosure from the perspective of the shareholder.130  A failure to 
disclose material information would be a per se violation of the duty of 
                                                 
125 Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 226-29 (discussing senior officers’ duties to the 
board).  The court faced the issue in Arnold v. Society for Saving Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 
1273, 1286, 1287 (Del. 1994),  but did not decide the issues because the plaintiff “failed to 
highlight any specific actions [CEO] undertook as an officer (as distinct from actions as a 
director) that fall within the two pertinent exceptions to Section 102(b)(7).”  See also 
Langervoot, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1195 (discussing duty of 
candor and the CEO). 
126 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282-84 (Del. 1989). 
127 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY  § 381 (1958).  “Duty To Give Information.  Unless 
otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal 
information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, 
the principal would desire to have and which can be communicated without violating a 
superior duty to a third person.” Id. 
128 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1086; Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 113-14 (Del. 
1992); Mills, 559 A.2d at 1283; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 260 (Del. 2000) 
(discussing whether materiality on matters not involving shareholders approval may be 
viewed differently). 
129 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1086. 
130 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166-68 (Del. 1995). 
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disclosure.131 Additionally, an officer’s duty to disclose to directors in the 
context of the oversight duties of directors will depend on the scope of 
the senior officers’ duties.132   
In Arnold, although the issue was raised, the court did not directly 
answer the question of officer liability.133  Rather, the court concluded 
that absent specific facts and allegations to highlight actions of a director 
who is also an officer carried out solely as an officer, the court would not 
address whether an officer is liable for failure to disclose.134  Later, the 
court in Disney would further explain that absent allegations which 
detail the breach of duties by an officer in his capacity as an officer, the 
court will not find culpability, even when it thinks the behavior of the 
senior officer is egregious.135  Although the court in Arnold ultimately 
determined that the board may have failed to disclose material facts, it 
did not directly decide the issue of whether the officer is more 
culpable.136  Consequently, it is clear from Arnold and Malpiede that 
materiality is closely tied to whether there is an affirmative duty.  
2. Affirmative Duty  
Directors owe no affirmative duty to disclose absent an obligation to 
speak or in voluntary communication to shareholders.137  In fact, 
directors are given the statutory authority to manage the affairs of the 
corporation and need only communicate to shareholders in certain 
transactions.138  However, an affirmative duty to inform owed by officers 
                                                 
131 See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 
A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993); Shell, 606 A.2d at 116; In re Anderson, Clayton Shareholders’ 
Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
132 Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1193 (explaining that 
an officer with complete discretion in corporate matters may have a lesser disclosure duty 
than an officer with defined parameters to act). 
133 Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1286 (Del. 1994). 
134 Id. 
135 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *50-
*51 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).  See also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 258, 259 (Del. 2000) 
(suggesting directors do not need to know everything, only reasonable information). 
136 Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1288. 
137 Brody v. Zaucha, 697 A.2d 749, 754 (Del. 1997); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84-85 
(Del. 1992); Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 115 (Del. 1992); Citron v. Fairchild 
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66-67 (Del. 1989).  The rationale is not to overload 
shareholders with information.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).  
But see Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (holding directors do have a duty to 
disclosure in the absence of a request for shareholder action). 
138 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005).  There is no statutory basis for disclosure.  The 
duty of disclosure is a Delaware common law principle applied to communications to 
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to directors is reasonably inferred from the plain reading of the 
delegation of authority statute, which permits directors to delegate and 
rely on officers for information.139  Under the Restatement of Agency, the 
duty to inform is an underlying duty owed by the agent to the 
principal.140  Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. provides support for finding an 
underlying duty of disclosure applicable to senior officers when 
communicating to directors and provides more direct support for a duty 
of disclosure when communicating to shareholders.141   
More specifically, the court in Mills concluded that officers of a 
corporation in a merger have the fiduciary duty to disclose information 
to directors that directly prevents the board from meeting its duty of 
disclosure to shareholders.142  Stating that officers must not use their 
position of superior knowledge to mislead directors and that this duty to 
inform is unremitting, the court explained that the board was completely 
reliant on senior management for critical information needed to assess 
the merger.143  As a result, the decision in Mills clearly supports an 
underlying duty of affirmative disclosure owed by senior officers to 
shareholders. 
3. Separate Duty 
Delaware law is somewhat muddled on whether the duty to disclose 
is a separate duty.144  Although officers are not included in Delaware’s 
                                                                                                             
shareholders.  See Veasey & Diguglielmo, supra note 18, at 1473-74 (discussing federal 
disclosure invasion of state law and transactions mostly defined by federal law). 
139 See Malone, 722 A.2d at 9 (holding directors do have a duty to disclosure in the 
absence of a request for shareholder action).  Although the decision is carefully worded as 
not to encroach on federal securities laws, it further supports finding an underlying duty of 
senior officers owed to directors.  See also Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 226-27. 
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY  § 381 (1958); see also Sci. Accessories Corp. v. 
Summagrahics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 961 (Del. 1980) (explaining that an agent owes a duty to 
disclose relevant information to the principle but is not required to do so in breach of a 
confidential agreement). 
141 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280-81 (Del. 1989).  Mills 
involved mandatory disclosure to shareholders.  Id.  See also Malone, 722 A.2d at 9 (holding 
directors do have a duty to disclosure in the absence of a request for shareholder action). 
142 Mills, 559 A.2d at 1280-81. See also Malone, 722 A.2d at 9 (holding that when directors 
communicate even without duty they must disclose honestly).  But see Mills, 559 A.2d at 
1280-81 (raising issues of whether senior officers breached the duty of loyalty). 
143 Mills, 559 A.2d at 1267, 1283. 
144 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001); Malone, 722 A.2d at 9; see also 
Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob, supra note 50, at 1149 (arguing it is an affirmative 
duty in cases of waste); Veasey & Diguglielmo, supra note 18, at 1473-74 (discussing lack of 
clarity in Delaware). 
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exculpation statute, it matters whether the duty of disclosure is a 
separate duty or part of a mixed duty of care, good faith and loyalty.  
First, a separate, underlying, and affirmative duty of disclosure means 
that officers may owe the duty even when directors are not 
communicating to shareholders.  In other words, the duty is not 
transaction specific for officers.  Second, if the duty of disclosure is a 
subset of broader fiduciary duties, then it is inconsistent with agency 
principles that view the duty to inform separate from other duties owed 
by agents.145  Further, a breach of the duty to disclose largely depends on 
whether the information not disclosed is material.146  Upon finding a 
duty and false disclosure, a court can find a per se violation of the 
disclosure duty.147  
The few Delaware cases addressing the issue support the principles 
that senior officers owe an unremitting affirmative duty to disclose 
material information, and that the duty is a separate duty.148  
Additionally, Delaware case law recognizes that senior corporate officers 
owe more than the same duties of disclosure directors owe to 
shareholders and that officers’ duties are different.149  Why should senior 
officers owe an affirmative duty to disclose when directors do not?  
Boards are dependent on the CEO and CFO for the accurate flow of 
information and cannot perform their oversight functions without it.  
The board’s duty of oversight is unremitting; therefore, the duty of 
senior officers to inform is also incessant.150 
                                                 
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958); see Sci. Accessories Corp. v. 
Summagrahics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 961 (Del. 1980) (explaining an agent owes a duty to 
disclose relevant information to the principle but is not required to do so in breach of a 
confidential agreement). 
146 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1086; Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112-14 (Del. 1992); 
Mills, 559 A.2d at 1283.  See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 260 (Del. 2000) (discussing 
whether materiality on matters not involving shareholders approval may be viewed 
differently); Malone, 722 A.2d at 9.  When directors communicate to shareholders, even 
when no action is requested, directors owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure and must provide 
accurate information.  Id. 
147 Malone, 722 A.2d at 9; In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993).  
Both courts indicate that a fiduciary duty of disclosure breach is a per se violation not 
requiring reliance by shareholders.  See Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob, supra note 
50, at 1124-41 (discussing key cases on a director’s fiduciary duty of disclosure). 
148 Mills, 559 A.2d at 1280-81.  See Malone, 722 A.2d at 9 (holding when directors 
communicate even without duty they must disclose honestly). 
149 Mills, 559 A.2d 1261. 
150 Public company boards must demand unremitting duty of disclosure of senior officers 
in order for directors to engage in proper oversight in managing the affairs of the 
corporation.  This duty should not be dependent subsequent disclosure to shareholders.  
See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 237 (discussing an officer’s duty). 
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V.  AGENTS AND THE DUTY TO INFORM 
A. Officers vs. Directors 
The duty of disclosure owed by directors to shareholders does not go 
far enough to hold CEOs or CFOs responsible for failing to inform their 
boards.  Senior corporate officers maintain a superior position of 
knowledge over directors; similarly, senior officers’ superior knowledge 
differs from the position of control a board exercises over shareholders.   
In fact, senior corporate officers of public companies are the 
bottleneck for the flow of corporate information.151  However, the 
directors’ current duties of disclosure do not properly fit the reality of 
dependence of the board on complete information from senior officers.152  
Just as the fiduciary duties of directors evolved to accommodate the 
limits on directors in providing information to shareholders, the role of 
senior corporate officers as the controllers of corporate information must 
evolve as well. 
More specifically, the position of power and influence of senior 
corporate officers, the CEO and CFO, as the conduits of corporate 
information should be recognized in assessing the nature of the agent 
relationship between and among senior officers, directors, and 
shareholders.153  In cases where courts have concluded otherwise, the 
cases have relied on the fact that the officer failed to carry out his job as 
officer.154     
Advising senior corporate officers of the duties to directors with a 
defined boundary for disclosure encourages CEOs and CFOs to be more 
candid with the board.155  In fact, open dialogue between senior officers 
and directors is frequently encouraged as a way to improve corporate 
governance.156  Such discussions are not an overly-broad intrusion into 
CEOs or CFOs ability to run the business and make sound business 
                                                 
151 Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat, supra note 87, at 312. 
152 Id. at 309-12. 
153 Id. 
154 Sci. Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962 (Del. 1980).  
Limiting liability of directors makes it difficult if not impossible to hold directors 
monetarily liable, but when directors fail to do their job because of officers’ failure to 
disclose officers should be accountable to the corporation and shareholders.  Id. 
155 Langervoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1202 (arguing against 
an affirmative duty to disclose). 
156 Veasey & Diguglielmo, supra note 18, at 1507 (suggesting best practices for corporate 
governance).  See also Business Roundtable CEOs Issues Updated “Best Practices” in Corporate 
Governance, supra note 2. 
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decisions.  Instead, it is a balanced cost of monitoring that appropriately 
views the role of the board as oversight for management.  The board can 
decide how much information they want from senior officers, either in 
the bylaws, employment contracts or less formal communications.157  
These documents will serve to judge materiality.158  
However, the duty of disclosure is but one example where the 
special position of senior corporate officers lends itself to application of a 
different assessment of the underlying fiduciary duties that officers owe 
directors and the corporation.159  Judged in the light of what we know 
about CEO and CFO conduct in the wake of scandals, there is little 
quarrel that CEOs with strong, charismatic personalities tend to exert 
dominance and control over public company boards.160   
Accordingly, finding an affirmative duty of senior corporate officers 
gives greater meaning to the oversight role of directors.161  The duty of 
disclosure must be a separate duty so that issues of materiality are 
judged in the context of what the Board deems relevant and material.162  
Moreover, an affirmative duty to disclose should not be subsumed into 
the duty of care or loyalty when senior officers are properly understood 
as the agents of directors.163  Based on these understandings, the question 
arises:  what is the form of the agency relationship between senior 
officers and directors and why does it matter?   
B. Sub-Agents or Co-agents 
To whom do officers owe their duties?  In returning to agency 
principles to more precisely define the nature of the three-way agency 
relationship among senior officers, directors, and shareholders, it is 
                                                 
157 Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1640-41. 
158 Properly defined parameters for senior officers are not an intrusion into their ability to 
run the business affairs of the corporation.  See Langervoort, Agency Law Inside the 
Corporation, supra note 39, at 1204. 
159 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (holding directors do have a duty to 
disclosure in the absence of a request for shareholder action). 
160 Commission on Public Trust, supra note 2.  See generally SKEEL, supra note 8, at 170-72 
(discussing corporate culture and the CEO). 
161 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1652.  See also Clark, supra note 37, at 71 
(discussing the common attribute of the fiduciary relationship as includes an affirmative 
duty to disclose). 
162 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001). 
163 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1636; Langervoort, Agency Law Inside the 
Corporation, supra note 39, at 1203 (stating the duty to disclose is subsumed into other 
duties.  It is subsumed for directors, but not officers). 
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necessary to understand issues of sub-agency and co-agency.164  A 
subagent is an agent who performs functions on behalf of the agent’s 
principal.165  The principal’s agent is primarily responsible for the 
subagent’s conduct provided the agent and principal have agreed.166  As 
a result, the subagent is subject to the control of the agent and has two 
principals—the delegating agent and the delegating agent’s principal.167 
Agency law developed around sub-agency and focuses on the 
authority of the agent to delegate authority to the subagent, the authority 
of the subagent, and liability of the agent for acts or omissions of the 
subagent.168  The sub-agent owes duties to the agent and to the 
principal.169  Additionally, in sub-agency, where the agent properly 
delegates to a subagent due to the subagent’s particular skill and the 
agent has exercised diligence in hiring the subagent, the principal or the 
delegator may seek a remedy directly against the subagent for 
misconduct.170   
In comparison, co-agents have a common principal, each owing the 
duties of an agent to a principal.171  The agents are not vicariously liable 
to each other, but owe duties to the common principal.172  Co-agents are 
                                                 
164 Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1602 (discussing the need for agency law discourse).  
See also Warren A. Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 68 HARV. L. REV. 658, 661 (1955) 
(discussing how courts rarely distinguish between agents appointed by another agent). 
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(1) (1958).  “A subagent is a person appointed 
by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions undertaken by the agent for the 
principal, but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the principal to be primarily 
responsible.”  Id.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 3) § 3.15(1) 
(2002) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative Draft No. 3].  “Subagent. A subagent is 
a person appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent has consented to 
perform on behalf of the agent’s principal.”  Id. 
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 5(b), 406; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative 
Draft No. 3 § 3.15 cmt. b. 
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 5(b), 406; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative 
Draft No. 3 § 3.15 cmt. b. 
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 5(b), 406; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative 
Draft No. 3 § 3.15 cmt. c. 
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 5(b), 406; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative 
Draft No. 3  §3.14 cmt. b. 
170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 5(b), 406; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative 
Draft No. 3 §3.15 cmt. b. 
171 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 2) § 1 (2001) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative Draft No. 2]. “Co-agents. Co-agents have agency 
relationships with the same principal.  A co-agent may be appointed by the principal or by 
another agent actually or apparently authorized by the principal to do so.”  Id.  See Seavey, 
supra note 164, at 666 (discussing liability of subagents). 
172 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Tentative Draft No. 2 § 1. 
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selected by either the agent designated by the principal, or the principal, 
and owe duties directly to the principal.173   
In corporations, directors are properly authorized to delegate certain 
duties to officers.174  Directors and officers are defined as agents of 
shareholders, but there is little case law defining senior officers selected 
by directors as either sub-agents or co-agents.175  Sorting out the nature 
of the agency relationship is necessary in order to figure out to whom the 
duty to inform is owed and how it is enforced.176  If senior officers are 
sub-agents properly appointed by the board, acting within the scope of 
their employment, senior officers who fail to inform are accountable to 
the directors for their acts and omissions.177  However, if senior officers 
and directors are co-agents, then they are not vicariously liable to each 
other; instead, senior officers owe their duties to shareholders.  All of this 
matters only to determine if a claim is direct or derivative.  
Application of the duty to inform as applied to senior officers reveals 
that officers and directors are different kinds of agents, each owing the 
same but different fiduciary obligations to the direct principal.  Using the 
same standards of conduct and liability for directors does little to 
recognize the total dependence of directors on officers to carry on their 
fiduciary obligations. 
What happens when directors rely in good faith on senior corporate officers 
who do not provide enough information for directors to be informed in 
circumstances where directors do not communicate to shareholders?178  The 
board is potentially responsible for the oversight failure and breach of fiduciary 
duties to shareholders.  But what about WorldCom, where the board exercised 
reasonable oversight, but was deliberately presented with fraudulent or 
                                                 
173 Id. 
174 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005). 
175 Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 1623 (discussing the blurring of corporate law 
officer fiduciary duties with agency costs theory). 
176 A more detailed analysis of the case law interpreting the duties and liabilities of 
subagents and coagents is beyond the scope of this paper.  The majority of cases on issues 
of subagent and coagents are not on matters of officers’ duty to directors and shareholders.  
An analysis of the cases is needed to understand the ramifications of subagents and 
coagents on corporate governance. 
177 They may also be indirectly liable to the shareholder for breach of duties owed the 
corporation. 
178 When directors communicate to shareholders based on misleading information 
provided by senior officer the law supports holding senior officers responsible directly to 
shareholders.  The more troubling scenarios are the WorldCom and Enron examples where 
the Board is regularly provided misleading information making it impossible for the Board 
to meet its oversight responsibilities. 
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misleading information by senior officers?  Shareholders’ class actions seeking to 
recover under securities laws for misleading disclosure by senior corporate 
officers provide potential monetary recovery.  Such shareholder class action 
litigation may not recover monetary or equitable remedies for the corporation.179  
These questions raise implications for corporate governance, which are discussed 
below.  
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A. The Business Judgment Rule 
As case law continues to develop and define the fiduciary duties of 
senior officers, there are several implications for corporate governance in 
finding an underlying affirmative duty to disclose. In a direct 
shareholder suit, one implication is the relevance of the business 
judgment rule to senior officers’ failure to inform directors.180  
In his insightful article, Professor Johnson suggests application of the 
business judgment rule to officers is not as clear in Delaware case law as 
is presumed.181  He argues that the rationales for the business judgment 
rule should not apply equally to officers and directors.182  Additionally, 
in the context of improper disclosures and materiality, Delaware case 
law suggests that the business judgment rule is less relevant.183  
In Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, the court concluded that 
misstatements in communications to minority shareholders amounted to 
a per se disclosure violation and that whether the majority shareholder 
knew or should have known of the disclosure error does not negate the 
disclosure duty.184  The holding in Shell suggests a duty to disclose may 
not raise issues of gross negligence or good faith in the context of 
assessing the materiality of disclosures.185  Indeed, the Delaware 
Chancery court suggested that the failure to inform on matters 
                                                 
179 Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1207 (discussing the 
difficulties on derivative Litig. in the context of senior officer misconduct). 
180 Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 20, at 464; Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment 
Rule, supra note 61, at 628-31. 
181 Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 20, at 441. 
182 Id. 
183 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10-12 (Del. 1998); In re Tri- Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 
A.2d 319, 333-34 (Del. 1993).  See also Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference:  
Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOS, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 748-
49 (2005) (discussing the need for finding state fiduciary duties and the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on decision-making). 
184 Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 115-16 (Del. 1992). 
185 Id.  See In re Anderson, Clayton Shareholders’ Litig., 519 A.2d 669 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
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fundamental to shareholders is not “a decision concerning the 
management of business and affairs of the enterprise of the kind the 
business judgment rule is intended to protect. . . . The quality of 
disclosure is inherently something that the court itself must ultimately 
evaluate.”186  As a result, what matters is materiality, which warrants 
enhanced judicial review.187   
Moreover, directors who unknowingly rely on misinformation 
provided to them by senior officers risk claims of lack of good faith in 
carrying out their oversight duties.188  Presumably, boards otherwise able 
to demonstrate good faith in meeting their fiduciary duties can present 
evidence to show that they were provided misleading or false 
information by senior officers.  Arguably, it follows that if senior 
corporate officers were under an affirmative duty to disclose, the need 
for judicial review would increase to assess materiality.  Additionally, it 
would render the business judgment rule less relevant to senior officers 
who fail to provide material information to directors.189  Consequently, it 
would be up to the interested parties to demonstrate the full disclosure.  
However, there would be no need to continuously inform the board; 
instead, senior officers must inform only on those matters requiring 
shareholder approval and on those matters that directly affect the ability 
of the directors to engage in oversight of significant corporate business 
matters.190  So, how is the affirmative duty to inform enforced and what 
is the remedy?  
B. Derivative Claims and Demand 
A second implication for corporate governance in finding an 
underlying affirmative duty to inform by senior corporate officers is in 
the derivative claim.  It potentially allows for recovery on behalf of the 
corporation, either in equity or monetary damages, against more 
                                                 
186 Anderson Clayton Shareholders’ Litig., 519 A.2d at 675 (citations omitted).  The case 
involved mandatory disclosure to shareholders in a vote to recapitalize the corporation.  Id. 
187 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001); Malone, 722 A.2d 5; see also Shell, 606 
A.2d at 115-16; Anderson Clayton Shareholders’ Litig., 519 A.2d at 675 . 
188 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  It is reasonable to argue that all 
information to directors requiring action or not then are to be judged under the standards 
of materiality.  Concerns about not allowing senior officers the protections of the business 
judgment rule are unwarranted when there is an affirmative duty to disclose.  Senior 
officers’ failure to disclose would be judged under the same exacting standards Delaware 
uses to assess materiality.  Senior officers will then be counseled in the context of 
materiality in regular communications to the board. 
189 Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 20, at 441.  But see Hamermesh & Sparks, supra 
note 20, at 866. 
190 Id. at 870-71. 
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culpable senior officers.191  This serves to complement federal disclosure 
violations that provide direct recovery to shareholders.192 
A claim by shareholders alleging a breach of the duty to inform must 
satisfy the two part test for determining if a suit is derivative:  (1) who 
suffered the injury; and (2) who is owed the remedy.193  Any recovery in 
a derivative suit flows to the corporation; 194 who suffered the injury in 
part turns on who is owed a duty.195  As previously discussed, senior 
officers owe fiduciary duties to directors, the corporation, and, 
ultimately, the shareholders.  Whether senior officers are sub-agents or 
co-agents is debatable and matters to properly define the nature of the 
three-agency relationship among senior officers, directors, and 
shareholders.  However, in all cases, failure of senior officers to properly 
inform directors of material information harms the corporation when 
there is a shareholder vote or when shareholders are not otherwise 
provided communications.196   
In Mills, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that board decisions 
made on the basis of undisclosed information from senior officers 
amount to deception and that the uninformed decisions are thus 
voidable by those owed the fiduciary duty.197  The potential to void even 
ratified decisions and monetary liability found to have been made based 
on false information can be a formidable tool to monitor the behavior of 
a CEO or CFO inclined to deliberately mislead the board. 
                                                 
191 See CG Hintmann, You Gotta Have Faith:  Good Faith in the Context of Directorial 
Fiduciary Duties and the Future Impact on Corporate Culture, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 571, 598-99 
(2005).  See also  Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 20, at 871 (explaining how officer liability 
insurance is denied to officers when the corporation initiates a claim against the officer. 
This may explain why few Boards sue senior officers directly but it should not limit 
equitable remedies). 
192 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 65, at 1575; Mills, supra note 65, at 440; Perion, supra note 
68, at 278. 
193 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004).  
Delaware case law is being developed in this area.  See Veasey & DiGuglielmo, supra note 
18, at 1469 (discussing borderline cases and the challenge of determining whether decisions 
not requiring shareholder approval or disclosure to shareholders by directors, or when 
directors choose not communicate with shareholders, is direct or derivative). 
194 Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036. 
195 Id. 
196 Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 115-16 (Del. 1992); Mills Acquisition Co. 
v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280-81 (Del. 1989). 
197 Mills, 559 A.2d at 1284.  See also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (suggesting 
compensation issues and disclosure are different); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 
(Del. 1993); Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1206-07 
(discussing the challenges of a shareholder suit under a candor breach. Raises issue of 
possible recovery in CEO compensation cases). 
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The goal of this Article is not to argue that senior corporate officers 
should be liable for failing to meet aspiratory goals of good corporate 
governance.198  Rather, the point is simply that CEOs and CFOs who 
deliberately withhold material information from directors ought to be 
accountable to the corporation and shareholders for failure to satisfy 
fundamental duties owed by agents to principals.  Enforcing state 
fiduciary duties are what agency cost theory encourages.199  Finding an 
underlying affirmative duty to disclose may offer an equitable solution 
to shareholders seeking to void decisions by directors that did not 
otherwise require shareholder approval.200  It also offers a potential for 
monetary recovery directly against senior corporate officers.201  The 
board can use employment contracts and ultimately terminate senior 
executives, although this offers only a partial solution to holding senior 
corporate officers responsible to directors, corporations, and 
stakeholders.202 
Additionally, a demand futility analysis poses a challenge to 
shareholders seeking to void a decision based on misinformation from a 
senior officer.203  Assuming that a shareholder can demonstrate demand 
futility by showing lack of independence, shareholders can seek 
equitable or other remedies.  However, this can be a formidable 
challenge to many shareholders.204  Yet, by understanding the agency 
relationship between senior officers and directors, an underlying 
affirmative duty to inform also offers directors the option to seek 
recovery from senior officers or equitable remedies on behalf of the 
corporation.  
                                                 
198 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256 (directly citing the aspirational goal of ALI and NACD 
principles). 
199 See Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1206-07. 
200 Id. at 1206-08. 
201 See Rales, 634 A.2d at 933 (demonstrating the importance of a state remedy where 
matter challenged does not involve a business decision).  See also Hamermesh & Sparks, 
supra note 20, at 871 (explaining how officer liability insurance is denied to officers when 
the corporation initiates a claim against the officer); Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 
20, at 468. 
202 Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 20, at 468.  See also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 
13 & nn.39-40 (Del. 1998) (discussing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998), and explaining the so called “Delaware 
Carve Out,” preserving exclusively derivative actions brought by shareholders on behalf of 
the corporation). 
203 Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation, supra note 39, at 1207 (discussing the 
challenges of a shareholder suit under a candor breach). 
204 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).  But see Rales, 
634 A.2d 927. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/4
2006] Senior Corporate Officers' Duties 299 
C. Importance of State Fiduciary Duties Under Federal Law 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and regulations (“SOX”) mandate the CEO 
and CFO to certify financial information and hold each personally 
accountable for the accuracy of financial information provided to 
shareholders.205  The Act further mandates that corporate attorneys 
advise management of state fiduciary duties.206  An affirmative 
underlying duty to inform serves to balance the role of state and federal 
laws in encouraging and enforcing open, candid corporate 
communication between senior officers and directors.  
Federal regulations and national exchange requirements requiring 
director independence are demanding more accountability and oversight 
of directors and officers.207  Directors should expect that the underlying 
duty to inform requires non-misleading communications from senior 
officers when directors are dependent on the veracity of the information 
provided by CEOs or CFOs.208   
                                                 
205 17 C.F.R. § 228 (2005).  The CEO and CFO are each required to certify in every 
quarterly and annual report, including any amendments thereto, the following:  Reviewed 
the report; Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit a 
material fact; Report fairly presents the financial condition of the company; Disclosure 
controls are in place to detect and ensure material information is known to the officers; 
They have evaluated the effectiveness of the disclosure controls; Report includes their 
evaluation and conclusions on the effectiveness of disclosure control procedures; The 
certifying officers have disclosed the auditors and audit committee any significant 
deficiencies in the design of internal controls; Disclosure of any fraud involving 
management; The certifying officers not any significant changes in internal controls and 
any corrective actions and material weaknesses.  Id.  Disclosure controls and procedures 
are defined as controls and other procedures designed to ensure that information required 
to be disclosed in the reports filed or submitted to the SEC.  Id. § 228 (Certification of 
Quarterly and Annual Reports); see also id. § 240.13a-14 (certification of disclosure in annual 
and quarterly reports). 
206 Id. § 205.1 (requires an attorney to report a material violation (including a breach of a 
fiduciary duty) by an officer and director (and others) “up the ladder” to a higher reporting 
authority); id. § 205.2(d) (defines breach of a fiduciary duty as a breach of federal of state 
statutory or common law “including but not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, 
abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of unlawful transactions”). 
207 Id. § 228 (requiring listed companies to develop a code of ethics for a company’s 
principal executive officers (CEO and CFO)).  Companies are not only to disclose a code of 
ethics, but if does not have a code of ethics explain why and disclose any waivers of the 
code of ethics.  Codes of ethics combined with enforcement state fiduciary duty to disclose 
offer a twofold strategy for monitoring corporate governance.  Id. 
208 See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275, 1283 (2002).  See also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 & nn.39-40 (Del. 1998) 
(discussing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (1998) and explaining the so called “Delaware Carve Out” preserving 
exclusively as derivative actions brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation); 
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Further, CEO and CFO certification of the veracity of federal 
disclosure mandates that officers not only know more information but 
also disclose it to shareholders.  These regulations work to ensure equal 
access to information by corporate actors.  SOX regulations look not only 
to the securities laws to ensure senior officers’ compliance with 
disclosure rules, but also state fiduciary laws to hold them accountable to 
shareholders.209  As a result, the affirmative underlying duty to inform 
balances state and federal law, allowing for more open communication 
between officers and directors. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article argues for finding an underlying duty to inform owing 
from senior corporate officers, in particular the CEO and CFO, to 
directors.  The basis for this underlying duty is consistent with basic 
agency principles and is also not inconsistent with Delaware case law 
that finds a duty to inform when communicating to shareholders and it 
suggests that the duty is an unremitting duty.  The duty is also consistent 
with the plain reading of Delaware’s corporate statute.  The benefits to 
corporate governance are twofold—potential voiding of transactions or 
business decisions of directors made based on misleading information 
and enhanced judicial scrutiny of senior officers’ disclosure to directors.  
The risks to senior officers’ ability to properly run corporate affairs when 
judicial review is judged under standards of materiality and appropriate 
use of the business judgment rule is minimal.  Delaware courts have 
demonstrated their ability to effectively evaluate and balance these 
competing legal interests. 
Public companies’ accounting and fraud scandals reveal the need for 
improvement in corporate governance. Finding an underlying 
affirmative duty to inform is not only consistent with agency principles, 
but it is also needed to provide shareholders a way to monitor and 
balance the superior positions of knowledge the CEO and CFO maintain 
over directors. 
                                                                                                             
Stevelman Kahn, supra note 103, at 513-14 (discussing the role of corporate managers in 
disseminating information). 
209 See Bratton, supra note 208, at 1283.  See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(d) (defining breach of a 
fiduciary duty as a breach of federal of state statutory or common law “including but not 
limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of 
unlawful transactions”); see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, 
Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (Findings).  “The Congress finds that— . . . (4) State 
securities regulation is of continuing importance, together with Federal regulation of 
securities, to protect investors and promote strong financial markets . . . .”  Id. 
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The relationship between senior officers and directors reveals a 
somewhat dysfunctional agency relationship, whereby the agent 
exercises a great deal of control over the principal.  Agency theory is 
designed to give principals a means to monitor the risks of the self-
interested agent, and thus, returning to agency principles to find an 
underlying affirmative duty of senior officers is appropriate.  It seems 
illogical, and in many ways unfair, for the most influential and often 
most culpable in the corporation not to have an unrelenting duty to 
provide accurate information to directors.  To conclude that senior 
officers owe the same kind of disclosure duties as directors ignores their 
position of power. 
Delaware law offers a framework and some support for 
acknowledging the different role of senior officers and the rationale for 
finding an unremitting duty to inform.  This does not encroach on the 
senior officers’ jobs to manage the day-to-day, but instead, will 
encourage more communication with the board and encourage boards to 
define how they want senior officers to communicate with them.  It does 
not necessarily increase liability risk, but merely allows the court to 
assess materiality in the context of what a reasonable director should 
expect.  By finding an underlying affirmative duty to disclose, enhanced 
judicial review of senior officers’ disclosure failures, judged in the 
context of materiality, offers shareholders state fiduciary law 
enforcement options to hold those most culpable accountable for 
corporate governance failures. 
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